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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. By pleading guilty in the justice court and not moving to 
withdraw their pleas, did appellees waive their rights to a trial 
de novo in district court or does Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) allow a 
trial de novo regardless of what happened in justice court? 
Standard of Review: The standard for review for questions of 
law is correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Citation to Record where Preserved: See tr. p. 3. 
2. Does Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) allow the State to appeal 
the district court's dismissal of its case or is the State 
precluded, by Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12), from appealing the district 
court's order of dismissal? 
(a) Does it matter, in determining if the rights of appeal of 
both parties have been exhausted, that appellees rather than 
the State appealed to district court? 
(b) Even though appellees have exhausted their rights of 
appeal (from justice court to district court), has the Sate 
exhausted any right it may have to appeal the district court's 
order which it has not previously appealed? 
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(c) Does the fact that the State originally brought the case 
in justice court, rather than district court, impact its 
ability to appeal the district court's decision? 
Standard of Review: The standard for review for questions of 
law is correctness. Pena, at 936. 
Citation to Record where Preserved: See tr. p. 3. 
3. If the State may appeal the trial court's order of 
dismissal, was it appropriate, under the circumstances, for the 
district court to have dismissed the State's case for failing to 
respond to appellees' discovery requests? 
Standard of Review: The standard for review for a judge's 
decisions regarding discovery is an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1988), State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026, 1027 (Utah 1982) . 
Citation to Record where Preserved: See tr. p. 3. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-2 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-l (1995, Supp. 1997) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp. 1997) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants' cases began in the Dutch John Precinct Court in 
Daggett County State of Utah. On or about September 25, 1996, the 
Defendants' cases were set for arraignment and fingerprinting. (R. 
at 2.) At that hearing the Defendants plead guilty to the charges 
contained in the citations, being possession of marijuana, 
possession of paraphernalia, and open container. (R. at 4 for 
Cynthia and R. at 5 for David.) On or about October 18, 1996, the 
Defendants filed Notices of Appeal with the Justice Court. (R. at 
9 for Cynthia and R. at 10-11 for David.) On or about October 28, 
1996, the Plaintiff filed Memorandums in Opposition to the 
Defendants' Appeals with the Justice Court. (R. at 10-12 for 
Cynthia and R. at 12-14 for David.) This matter was then set for 
Arraignment/Appeal with the District Court on March 28, 1997. (R. 
at 14-15 for Cynthia and R. at 15-16 for David.) On or about 
March 25, 1997, counsel for the Defendants filed an "Appearance of 
Counsel Entry of Not Guilty Plea Demand for Jury Trial", "Request 
for Discovery", and "Request for Bill of Particulars" for each of 
the defendants. (R. at 16-26 for Cynthia and R. at 17-28 for 
David.) This matter was then set for Pre-Trial on June 6, 1997. 
(R. at 27-28 for Cynthia and R. at 29-30 for David.) At pretrial 
the court and the parties addressed the issue of the appeals from 
Justice Court. (Tr. at 2-4.) The Plaintiff had filed memorandums 
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LII i.([ pusif: ion t«; t;hr- .appeals. u - 0-12 for Cynthia and R. at 
12-14 for David.) The court ru • luj motions allowing each 
Defendant to have a trial de novo. (Tr. at 2-4.) The defendants' 
attorney then raised rhe issue of discovery that had been requested 
but had not yet been received. (Tr. at 2-4.) Defendants'' counsel 
then requested that this matter be dismissed. (Tr. at 2-4 ) When 
questioned by ' h.n 'purr , the defendants' attorney stated that he 
made no calls or letters requesting discovery. (Tr. at 3.) The 
Plaintiff addressed the court and opposed the motion to dismiss. 
(Tr. at 3-4.) The court ruled that the motion to dismiss was 
granted. (Tr. at 4 .) The Order and Judgments were filed with the 
court on or about July 8, 1997. (R. at 31-33 for Cynthia and R. at 
33-35 for David.) The Defendants filed Objections to Order and 
Judgments on or about July 18, 1997. (R. at 36-42 for Cynthia and 
R. at 38-43 for David.) The Plaintiff filed a Reply to Objections 
to Order and Judgment on or about August 4, 1997. (R. at 43-45 for 
Cynthia and R. at 44-46 for David). The Order and Judgments were 
signed by the court August 29, 1997, and Plaintiff filed its 
Appeals September 26, 1997. (R. at 31-33 and 47-48 for Cynthia and 
R. at 33-35 and 48-49 for David.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendants waived their right to a trial de novo by 
pleading guilty at the Justice Court level. Once a guilty plea has 
been entered there are no issues for trial. The judgment after a 
plea of guilty can still be reviewed de novo by the district court; 
however only the judgment is reviewed. The proper method of 
contesting a guilty plea is to move to withdraw the plea not 
appeal. 
The Utah R. Crim. P. have a mechanism for reviewing a final 
dismissal of a case. Utah R. Crim. F. 26(3) (a) allows the state to 
appeal without limitation a final judgment of dismissal. The 
decision appealed by the state is one of first impression in the 
district court and not part of the decision appealed from the 
justice court, therefore not limited by Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) . 
The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the 
case at the pretrial stage for lack of response by the state to 
discovery. Utah R. Crim. P. 16 sets forth less harsh remedies for 
discovery violations which should be utilized prior to a dismissal 
of a case. Dismissal is only proper when all other attempts to 
mitigate have failed. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. TRIAL DE NOVO 
The defendants waived their right to a trial de novo by 
pleading guilty at the justice court level• 
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp 1997) states the 
following: 
Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a 
justice court, whether rendered by default or after 
trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the district 
court of the county as provided by law. The judgment 
after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court 
rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
This section of the Code implies that a trial or default took place 
in the justice court. Default suggests that the defendants failed 
to defend their position or show up for court. Such is not the 
case now before the court. The defendants took an active part in 
the justice court action by pleading guilty. In doing so they 
waived certain rights including the ability to have a trial de 
novo. Had they not shown up and there had been a forfeiture or a 
trial in absentia then they could have had a trial de novo in the 
district court because they had not waived their rights by entering 
a guilty plea. "A voluntary plea of guilty or no contest 
constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional 
issues..." State v. Smith. 883 P.2d 371, 372 (UtahCt. App. 1992), 
see also State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and 
State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The 
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defendants plead guilty and admitted to the charges. A trial on 
the evidence is not a jurisdictional issue therefore the defendants 
are not allowed a trial de novo in the district court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) which reads, "An appeal may be taken 
to the district court from a judgment rendered in the justice court 
under this rule, except: (a) the case shall be tried anew in the 
district court..." does not necessarily imply that the defendants 
get a trial de novo. Utah R. Crim P. 26(12). "Once a plea of 
guilty is knowingly and voluntarily entered, there are no issues 
for trial." State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 1977). By 
pleading guilty the defendants acknowledged that they were guilty 
of the offense charged. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-2 (1995) . The 
defendants in this case can still have the judgment appealed to the 
district court and the district court will then review that 
judgment de novo i.e. giving no deference to the justice court's 
decision. The defendants plead guilty in this case therefore 
waiving a trial on the issues. 
The Court of Appeals in Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) explains the relief for a defendant once a guilty 
plea has been entered. 
In Gibbons, [State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)] 
the Supreme Court determined that a defendant could not 
simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea. Id. 
at 1311-12. Rather, defendant must first file a motion 
to withdraw plea, giving the court who took the plea the 
first chance to consider defendant's arguments. Id. If 
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the motion is denied, defendant could then appeal-- not 
from the conviction per se, but from the denial of the 
motion. See id. . . .Defendant must first move to set 
aside the plea; he or she can not challenge the plea for 
the first time on appeal from the conviction. 
Summers at 342-43. "A defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's 
ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an appellate 
court." State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted) . The defendants in this case should have first 
moved to withdraw their guilty pleas in order to properly contest 
their guilty pleas. 
This case is distinguishable from Kanab v. Guskey, 337 Utah 
Adv. R. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 
853 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) aff'd 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert denied, 
489 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1990) , and State v. 
Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) in that in all of those 
cases the defendants went through the trial process in the justice 
court and appealed. The defendants in the matter before the court 
did not have a trial in the justice court they merely entered 
guilty pleas and then appealed the decision of the court. The 
defendants waived their right to a trial and therefore a trial de 
novo in the district by pleading guilty. 
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2. APPEAL OF DISMISSAL 
a. There must be a mechanism to review the action of the 
district court when there is a decision of dismissal. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the State v. Jaeger, 886 P. 2d 53 
(Utah 1994) addresses the issue of appeal after a final judgment of 
dismissal. In the Jaeger case the magistrate held there was 
insufficient evidence to bind the defendant over for trial and as 
a result the magistrate dismissed the information. Id. The state 
appealed. In the interim the Utah Supreme Court issued State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991) which held that a decision to 
bind a defendant over for trial is not a final, appealable order. 
Id. at 468. The Utah Court of Appeals then dismissed the Jaeger 
appeal. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which 
was granted. Jaeger at 53-54. 
The Court in Jaeger went on to analyze the decision not to 
bind a case over for trial coupled with the decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). The 
Court concluded that in such cases when the defendant is not bound 
over for trial "coupled with the State's inability to refile under 
Brickey, clearly constitutes 'a final judgment of dismissal' as 
contemplated by section 77-l8a-(2) (a) (Supp. 1997) , which the State 
is entitled to appeal.ff Jaeger at 55. The Court also states that 
"it would be anomalous, indeed, if such a final adjudicative 
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decision were not subject to appeal." Id. Such is the case in the 
matter before the Court, it would be anomalous if this final 
decision of dismissal were not subject to appeal. Recognizing a 
need for a check on such actions of the district court the Supreme 
Court in footnote 3 of the Jaeger case added: 
...The State, however, has no comparable procedural 
mechanism allowing reexamination of a decision not to 
bind a defendant over for trial. Logic suggests that 
some mechanism must exist for correcting the mistaken 
dismissal of charges where refiling is not an option. A 
plain reading of Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-l (2) (a) (Supp. 
1994) shows that the Legislature has provided that 
mechanism by expressly permitting the State to appeal, 
without state limitation, any "final judgment of 
dismissal." 
Jaeger at footnote 3. Such is the case in the matter before the 
court. A mechanism must exist for correcting the mistaken 
dismissal or procedural mistakes of the district court. 
b. The State's right to appeal a final judgment of dismissal 
under Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) is not limited by Utah R. 
Crim. P. 26(12)(a) in this case. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) limits the right to appeal from a 
justice court to a district court and states that the decision of 
the district court is final except where the constitutionality of 
a statute or ordinance is disputed. Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12)(a). 
The rule states that the case shall be tried anew meaning a trial 
de novo on the issues. Id. Similar to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) 
is Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp. 1997) which states: 
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Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a 
justice court, whether rendered by default or after 
trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the district 
court of the county as provided by law. The judgment 
after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court 
rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp. 1997) . This case has not yet 
come under the scrutiny of these provisions. Both of these 
statutes and rules contemplate a trial de novo and therefore a 
review of the issues presented before the justice court. 
There has not been a trial in the district court because the 
case had not yet reached the trial stage. The district court 
dismissed the case for a discovery violation at pretrial. The 
decision or issue that was appealed from the justice court has not 
yet come before the district court. Thus far the district court 
has not acted as an appellate court in reviewing a decision of the 
justice court. The district court in this case has acted only as 
a trial court hearing the matter for the first time. Since the 
defendants plead guilty at the justice court, not until the 
district court reviews the defendants' sentences or sentences the 
defendants after a trial or another guilty plea does it act as an 
appellate court and review the decision of the justice court. 
The defendants plead guilty and exhausted their appeal of 
their guilty pleas and sentences to the district court. The state 
however has not exhausted its ability to appeal. Utah R. Crim. P. 
26(3) (a) and Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-l (2) (a) (1995, Supp. 1997) 
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allow an appeal by the prosecution from "a final judgment of 
dismissal." Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) and Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-
1(2) (a) (1995, Supp. 1997). No restrictions have been placed on 
this right to appeal a final judgment of dismissal. The issue of 
discovery was never discussed at the justice court level and was 
not part of the judgment appealed from the justice court. It is a 
matter of first impression for the district court. The merits of 
the cases against the defendants have not been before a judge. The 
decision of the district court was a final judgment of dismissal 
and therefore the state is not limited in its appeal. There has 
not been a trial de novo to review the justice court decision and 
the issue of discovery was not appealed from justice court, 
therefore it has not been reviewed by the district court acting as 
an appellate court for the justice court and not prohibited by Utah 
R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) . 
It does not matter that this action was first brought in the 
justice court instead of the district court. Had the justice 
court's decision of the case been a final order of dismissal the 
state's right to appeal would have been to the district court. The 
district court on its own initiative and not in review of anything 
the justice court had decided upon entered an order of final 
dismissal. The state is therefore allowed to appeal this decision 
since it was not a matter that had been part of the decision 
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appealed from the justice court. On the matter of discovery the 
district court was not acting in its authority as an appellate 
court, it was an issue of first impression for the district court. 
The state's ability to appeal final judgments of dismissal is not 
limited in Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3). 
3. DISMISSAL OF CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY 
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case 
for failure of the prosecutor to provide discovery at 
pretrial. 
This case is distinct from the many cases researched for this 
issue. In those cases the case was at the trial stage when the 
discovery violation occurred or was discovered. In this case the 
matter was before the judge for a pretrial. A trial date had not 
yet been set. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b) states that "the prosecutor shall make 
all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of 
charges and before the defendant is required to plea...." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 16(b). As stated at the hearing the State was still 
gathering the information to respond to discovery. (See tr. p. 3-
4.) The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1989) stated, ,fthe crux of a rule 16(g) motion is a requirement 
that the moving party show that the other party has failed to 
furnish discovery as required by rule 16." Larson at 418. The 
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matter before the Court now was set for pretrial not trial. There 
was still ample time to respond to the discovery prior to trial. 
The dismissal of the case at that stage of the case was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed the issue of discovery 
violations in the case of State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
1988) . In this case the Court looked to their decision and 
interpretation of the case of State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 
1987) . The Court in Griffiths explained the procedure for 
determining abuse of discretion as follows: 
In Knight/ after having determined that the prosecutor 
violated his discovery duties, we reached the issue of * 
whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 
to grant the defendant's requested relief. We indicated 
that the determination of whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying defendant relief under rule 
16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure turned upon 
"whether the prosector's failure to produce the requested 
information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant 
reversal under Rule 3 0." 
Griffiths, at 882 (footnotes omitted). Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) 
states "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
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affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). 
In this case the substantial rights of the defendants were not 
prejudiced, therefore the failure of the State to provide discovery 
should be disregarded. Clearly the defendants are entitled to 
discovery as set forth in Utah R. Crim. P 16; however, dismissing 
the case for lack of response to discovery at the pretrial stage of 
this case was an abuse of discretion. The act of the Judge 
dismissing the case was an infringement of the substantial rights 
of the state. 
The case of State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) is directly on point for remedies regarding discovery. 
In the Christofferson case on the morning of trial the prosecution 
became aware of exculpatory statements made by the defendant to the 
officer. The prosecutor did not disclose these statements to the 
defense and the defense learned about them when the officer 
testified. The defense did not object, move for a continuance, or 
request a mistrial. The defense cross examined the officer and 
then at a recess moved to dismiss the charges based on the 
discovery violation. Christofferson, at 945-46. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g) sets forth the remedy for a violation 
of Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
If at any time during the course of proceedings it is 
brought to the attention of the court that a party has 
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failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing 
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order 
as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g). The Court in the Christofferson case 
explains that dismissal was unreasonable when other less harsh 
remedies were available. 
When the discovery violation was brought to the attention 
of the court, defendant did not object, request a 
continuance, or call for a mistrial. Rather, defendant 
moved to dismiss. Under the circumstances, it was not 
unreasonable for the trial court to deem it unjust to 
grant the defendant's motion when there were other, less 
harsh remedies specifically mentioned in the statute 
available to him." 
Christofferson, at 948. 
The court in Christofferson also looked to the Knight and 
Griffiths cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court stated that " [a] pivotal fact in our 
reversal of Knight was defense counsel's timely efforts 
to obtain relief in order to mitigate the potential or 
suffered prejudice caused by the prosecutor's wrongful 
conduct." Griffiths, at 882-83 (footnote omitted). The 
court went on to hold that by failing to move for a 
continuance, "defendant [Griffiths] waived relief under 
rule 16(g) as implemented in Knight by not making timely 
efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by 
the prosecutor's conduct." Id. at 883 (footnote 
omitted) ; see also State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53 
(Utah 1981). 
Christofferson, at 948. 
The statute offers several remedies to the court including 
permitting discovery or inspection, continuances, or not allowing 
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evidence to be introduced at trial. The district court in the case 
now before the Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case. 
The matter was before the court for pretrial. The defendants had 
not tried to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice if any to them by 
a simple letter or phone call to follow up on discovery. There was 
plenty of time to respond to discovery prior to trial. The 
pretrial could have been continued and the state given a time limit 
within which to respond to discovery. There were a number of 
remedies available to the court that were less harsh than 
dismissing the case. "Dismissal is proper only when all other 
attempts to mitigate damage caused by unexpected evidence have 
failed." Id. No attempts to mitigate were present in this case. 
Dismissal was an abuse of the court's discretion therefore the 
dismissal should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants plead guilty at the trial stage of this case, by 
doing so they waived their right to a trial. Once a guilty plea 
has been entered there are not any issues for trial. The actions 
of the defendants have precluded them from having a trial de novo 
in the district court. 
The State's right to appeal a final judgment of dismissal 
under Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) is not limited by Utah R. Crim. P. 
26(12) (a) . A plain reading of Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) shows that 
17 
the legislature has provided a mechanism for correcting the 
mistaken dismissal of charges. There is no limitation placed on 
the prosecution's appeal of a final judgment of dismissal. The 
matter before the district court was one of first impression and 
not a matter on appeal from the justice court, therefore the right 
of the state to appeal had not been exhausted by the defendants' 
appeal from the justice court. 
It was not appropriate for the district court to dismiss this 
case for failure to provide discovery when less harsh remedies were 
specified in the statute, the matter before the court was a 
pretrial and not a trial, and the defendants made no attempt to 
mitigate their prejudice if any. Dismissal is proper only in 
situations where all other attempts to mitigate have failed. The 
dismissal should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial 
court to continue with the trial process. 
DATED this O r day of March, 1998. 
Daggett County Attorney 
By-.^Uikk^ Qfilmn 
Rachelle L. Palmer 
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contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «$=» 268 
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87 
A L R 4th 384 
77-13-2. Record of plea — Effect of each k i n d of plea. 
Every plea shall be entered upon the record of the court and shall have the 
following effect. 
(1) A plea of not guilty is a denial of the guilt of the accused and puts in 
issue every material allegation of the information or indictment; 
(2) A plea of guilty is an acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of 
the offense charged; and 
(3) A plea of no contest indicates the accused does not challenge the 
charges in the information or indictment and if accepted by the court shall 
have the same effect as a plea of guilty and imposition of sentence may be 
rendered in the same manner as if a plea of guilty had been entered. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS NO contest. 
Guilty plea —Appellate review. 
77 The general rule of appellate procedure pre-
. U eludes appellate review of Fourth Amendment 
p p
 issues when the defendant has entered an 
Guilty plea. unconditional no contest plea after losing his 
suppression motion However, this rule is map-
Effect. phcable when the plea entered by the defen-
Unless timely withdrawn, a plea of guilty
 d a n t W l t h t h e c o n s e n t 0f the prosecution and 
placed a defendant in the same position as a
 a c c e p ted by the trial judge specifically pre-
verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the charge
 s e r v e s t h e S Upp r e s s i 0n issue for appeal and 
aaer a fair and impartial trial A plea of guilty
 a l l o w s W l t h d r a w a l o f t h e p i e a if the defendant's 
was a confession of the correctness of the accu-
 a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o r o f s u p p ression are accepted 
sation which dispensed with the necessity of
 fe fche l l a t e c o u r t S t a t e v s 7 5 8 p 2 d 
proof thereof State v Stewart, 110 Utah 203,
 Q~K m*Jun* A „ IQQQ\ 
171 P2d 383 (1946) 9 3 5 ( U t a h C t A p P 1 9 8 8 ) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <£=» 269 
77-13-3. Court approval of no contest plea required. 
A plea of no contest may be entered by the accused only upon approval of the 
court and only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the 
interest of the public in the effective administration of justice. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
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77-18-17. Retroactive application. 
The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply retroactively to 
all arrests and convictions regardless of the date on which the arrests were 
made or convictions were entered. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-17, enacted by L. became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
1994, ch. 143, § 9. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 143 
CHAPTER 18a 
THE APPEAL 
Section 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
77-18a-2. Capital cases. 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77«18a«l, enacted by L. recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former 
1990, ch. 7, § 10. Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah 
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Double jeopardy. 
Appealability. "a b .e a f 9 «n>us ruhng 
Appeal by defendant. Oral statements from bench. 
Appeal by prosecut.on. Suppression orders. 
Arrest of judgment. Appealability. 
Bind over orders. Tb determine whether an appeal falls within 
Death penalty cases. one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate 
"Dismissal." court looks to the substance of the ruling and 
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not to the label attached by a trial judge. State 
v. Workman, 806 R2d 1198 (Utah C t App.), 
aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
Appeal by defendant . 
A purported second judgment and sentence, 
which was clearly an attempt to render a judg-
ment in criminal proceeding which if valid 
would have affected defendant's rights, was 
appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14, 
386 R2d 411 (1963). 
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights pro-
tected by the double jeopardy guarantee neces-
sitate review on appeal before a second trial if 
defendant is to enjoy full protection of the 
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1979). 
Appeal by prosecut ion . 
District court's judgment, discharging defen-
dant in criminal prosecution and releasing his 
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was 
( final judgment from which state might appeal. 
i State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899). 
[, State had right of appeal from judgment 
i discharging defendant, in prosecution for fel-
ony, on ground that information did not state 
I facts sufficient to constitute public offense. 
I State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 P. 815 
1(1902). 
E The state had no right to appeal sentence 
| imposed upon defendant since the imposition of 
tsentence was part of the judgment, and not an 
torder made after judgment. State v. Kelbach, 
|569P2d 1100 (Utah 1977K 
i Former section did not authorize the prosecu-
ktion to appeal an acquittal, no matter how 
^overwhelming the evidence against the defen-
Edant may be. State v. Musselman, 667 P2d 
11061 (Utah 1983). 
• Where dismissal of charge was based on trial 
•Court's construction of the applicable law before 
•the court ruled on the sufficiency of the evi-
•dence to convict, the ruling was, in effect, a 
••final judgment of dismissal" and therefore was 
•ippealable even though the ruling was made at 
•the close of all the evidence State v. 
•Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
v The state may not, following a pretrial ruling 
Suppressing some state's evidence, request dis-
• missal of a criminal case in order to avoid the 
•discretionary appeal provisions and to obtain 
• i n appeal of right. State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d 
•223 (Utah 1985). 
K A trial court's dismissal of a case on the 
•ground that the prosecution has not proved an 
•element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
•doubt is in substance an acquittal and therefore 
Ml not appealable. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d 1279 
•Utah Ct. App 1988). 
K State could not appeal an order granting 
Kefendant a new trial after he moved to arrest 
judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial 
where the trial court did not, in substance, 
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
An appeal by the state properly lies only from 
the order of dismissal and does not lie from the 
denial of a motion for new trial. State v. John-
son, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Arrest of judgment . 
A trial court's ruling was an arrest of judg-
ment and not an acquittal where the trial court 
found that the facts proved did not constitute a 
crime because the defendant, a general partner, 
could not have committed theft by taking part-
nership property. Although the trial court's or-
der was also labeled an acquittal, the order was 
not based on a finding of insufficient evidence. 
Thus, the state had a right to appeal. State v. 
Larsen, 834 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Bind over orders. 
Defendant, a juvenile whose preliminary ex-
amination was conducted in district court 
rather than in circuit court, was not denied the 
right to review of the bind over order by a 
superior court, since he had the same right to 
seek review as does any other criminal defen-
dant. State v. Schreuder, 712 P2d 264 (Utah 
1985). 
Death penal ty cases. 
While Utah law does not compel a defendant 
sentenced to death to go through every proce-
dure that a defendant might voluntarily in-
voke, the law does require one automatic ap-
peal even when "the defendant has chosen not 
to pursue his own appeal " State v. Holland, 777 
P2d 1019 Utah 1989) 
"Dismissal." 
The language "a final judgment of dismissal" 
refers to dismissals where the trial court con-
strues the applicable law before ruling on the 
sufficiency of the evidence to convict and before 
a final judgment. State v. Amador, 804 P2d 
1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
When a motion to suppress evidence is re-
newed following closing arguments and is 
granted, the order granting the motion is an 
acquittal and not a "dismissal" as that term is 
used in this section and Utah R. Cnm. P. 
26(3)(a), and is not subject to appeal by the 
state. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990», cert, denied, 815 P2d 241 (Utah 
1991). 
. Ruling labeled as a "dismissal" was not ap-
pealable because the judge's decision came af-
ter trial of the issues involved and was a ruling 
on the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. 
Workman, 806 P2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.), afFd, 
852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
Trial court's ruling at the end of the state's 
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case that "the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence to make out a prima facie case on any 
of the remaining counts of the information" and 
dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal and 
not a dismissal. State v. Jackson, 857 R2d 267 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Double jeopardy. 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based 
upon former jeopardy defense was not a final 
judgment from which an appeal could be taken. 
State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978). 
Habeas corpus ruling* 
District court's ruling on habeas corpus peti-
tion was final, appealable judgment. Winnovich 
v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988 (1908). 
Oral statements from bench. 
Oral statements made from the bench are not 
the judgment of the case and therefore are not 
appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1978). 
Suppression orders. 
An appellate court will review suppression 
orders on appeal from a dismissal only wheie 
the trial court certifies that the evidence sup-
pressed substantially impairs the prosecution's 
case. The Supreme Court requires the state to 
request dismissal with prejudice to obtain re-
view of suppression orders on an appeal of right 
from a dismissal. State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
same offense as ground for reversal of convic-
tion, 96 A.L.R.3d 1174. 
Waiver or estoppel in incompetent legal rep-
resentation cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 807. 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding appellate and 
postconviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582. 
Presence of alternate juror in jury room as 
ground for reversal of state criminal conviction, 
15 A.L.R.4th 1127. 
Appealability of order suspending imposition 
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R.4th 939. 
Abatement effects of accused's death before 
appellate review of federal criminal conviction, 
80 A.L.R. Fed. 446. 
A.L.R. — When criminal case becomes moot 
so as to preclude review of or attack on convic-
tion or sentence, 9 A.L.R.3d 462. 
Appealability of orders or rulings, prior to 
final judgment in criminal case, as to accused's 
mental competency, 16 A.L.R.3d 714. 
Court's presentence inquiry as to, or consid-
eration of, accused's intention to appeal as 
error, 64A.L.R.3d 1226. 
Validity and effect of criminal defendant's 
express waiver of right to appeal as part of 
negotiated plea agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864. 
Appeal by state of order granting new trial in 
criminal case, 95 A.L.R.3d 596. 
Judgment favorable to convicted criminal de-
fendant in subsequent civil action arising out of 
77-18a-2. Capital cases. 
After the resolution of an initial appeal of a capital case when the sentence 
of death has been imposed, a subsequent appeal may not be entertained by any 
court and a stay of execution of the sentence may not be granted when the 
appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or when the new 
matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-2, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 7, § 11. 
CHAPTER 19 
THE EXECUTION 
Section 
77-19-1. 
77-19-2. 
77-19-3. 
Judgment for fine or costs — En-
forcement. 
Judgment of imprisonment — 
Commitment. 
Special release from city or county 
jail — Purposes. 
Section 
77-19-4. 
77-19-5. 
77-19-6. 
Special release from city or county 
jail — Conditions and limita-
tions. 
Special release from city or county 
jail — Revocation. 
Judgment of death — Warrant — 
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CHAPTER 18a 
THE APPEAL 
Section 
77-18a-1. Appeals — When proper. 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment tha t affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony 
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
would be in the interest of justice; 
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under subsec-
tion (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as 
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony 
information, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides 
that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enac ted by L. 
1990, ch. 7, $ 10; 1995, ch. 65, § 1; 1997, ch. 
364, § 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the phrase 
"Dismissal." 
A preliminary-hearing magistrate's order 
dismissing a felony information and discharg-
ing the defendant based on the magistrate's 
conclusion that there was insufficient probable 
beginning "including a dismissal" to Subsection 
(2)(ah 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
added Subsection (2)(f) and made related sty-
listic changes. 
cause to bind the defendant over for trial was "a 
final judgment of dismissal" and the state was 
entitled to appeal. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1994). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
78-2a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The t e rm of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in t h a t office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enac ted by L. 
1986, eh. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare dec i s i s . panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v. U tah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases invoiv- R2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary wri ts and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natura l 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
| (j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch . 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, $ 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch . 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Mh) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(hj through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and 
inserted ' 'Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
ANALYSIS 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Final order. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
— Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Decis ions of Board of Pardons . 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept when the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v. 
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994). 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands" for ''Division of Sover-
eign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection <2Ka). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2>(d>, 
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesig-
nated former Subsections (2)<e) to 12 M k) as 
(2)(d) to (2)(j). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
Extraordinary writs . 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directed 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v Murphy, 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The term ''original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition originally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard 
v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over adjudi-
cative proceedings of state agencies, and be-
cause § 63-46b-l preserves the availability of 
extraordinary writ proceedings to compel 
agency actions, the court had jurisdiction of a 
writ seeking to compel the recusal of the pre-
siding officer appointed to conduct proceedings 
before the Division of Environmental Response 
and Remediation. V-l Oil Co. v. Department of 
Envtl. Quality, 893 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Final order. 
Because an order by the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing converting a 
citation proceeding from an informal to a for-
mal proceeding was not a "final agency action," 
the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider a petition for review of that order. 
Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dep't of 
Commerce, 902 P.2d 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Habeas corpus proceedings . 
The language of this section is sufficiently 
broad to include those cases where a criminal 
conviction is involved in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding challenging extradition. Hernandez v. 
Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals lacked original appel-
late jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of 
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate 
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to 
his underlying criminal conviction, except that 
"but for" the conviction, he would not have been 
incarcerated in Arizona and then transferred to 
Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court 
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the post-
conviction actions of the board of pardons and 
did not challenge the conviction in the trial 
court or the sentence, and the fact that defen-
dant was serving a sentence for a first-degree 
felony did not require a transfer to the Supreme 
Court under the circumstances. Northern v. 
Barnes, 814 R2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
aff'd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1992). 
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition, in which defendant claimed only that 
his due process rights were violated at a hear-
ing before the parole board, lay to the Court of 
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129. 
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals 
of first degree or capital felony convictions and 
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-
viction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 R2d 473 (Utah 1991). 
Post -convict ion review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This s tatute defines the outermost limits of 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing 
the court to review the orders of every admin-
istrative agency for which there is no statute 
specifically creating a right to judicial review. 
DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 
P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
This s ta tute does not authorize the Court of 
Appeals to review the orders of every adminis-
trative agency, but allows judicial review of 
agency decisions "when the legislature ex-
pressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional Li-
censing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 'U tah 1992). 
— S e n t e n c e reduct ion. 
When a conviction is reduced under § 76-3-
402, the appeal lies in the court having juris-
diction of the degree of crime recorded in the 
judgment of conviction and for which defendant 
is sentenced, rather than the degree of crime 
charged in the information or found in the 
verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P2d 1168 (Utah 
1991). 
Cited in Scientific Academv of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d 
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991); 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Transfer authority. 
An appeal by criminal defendant under Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
from the denial of his motion to declare his 
sentence illegal was not an appeal of his capital 
felony conviction and the Supreme Court had 
the power to pour it over to the Court of Appeals 
for decision. State v. Hua, 926 R2d 884 (Utah 
1996). 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983 — Par t III, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Magistrate bind-over orders. 
Cited. 
M a g i s t r a t e b i n d - o v e r o r d e r s . 
This section does not permit direct interlocu-
tory appeal of magistrate bind-over orders. 
State v. Quinn, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). 
C i ted in Wisden v. Dixie College Parking 
Comm, 935 P.2d 550 (Utah Ct App 1997). 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-4. 
78-3-12.5. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-24. 
Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
Coats of system. 
Judicial Council — Creation — 
Members — Terms and elec-
tion — Responsibilities — Re-
ports. 
Court administrator — Powers, 
duties, and responsibilities. 
Section 
78-3-25. 
78-3-29 
Assistants for administrator of 
the courts — Appointment of 
trial court executives. 
Presiding judge — Associate 
presiding judge — Election — 
Term — Compensation — 
Powers — Duties. 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other 
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline 
consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
7 8 - 5 - 1 2 0 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Priority of l iens. 
Where judgment rendered by justice of peace 
became lien upon land by being duly docketed 
in district court, but before it was enforced by 
levy and sale, mortgage lien also accrued and 
thereafter time limited by statute for lien of 
ANALYSIS 
Appealable judgments. 
— Finality. 
Jurisdiction of appellate court. 
— Amount in controversy. 
— Lack of jurisdiction in justice court. 
— Waiver of objections. 
Consenting that case be set for trial. 
Final judgment 
— When determined. 
Parties entitled to appeal. 
— One of several defendants. 
Statutory compliance. 
Appealable judgments . 
— Finality, 
Justice's judgment was final for purpose of 
taking appeal when it terminated action or 
proceeding in which it was rendered, regardless 
of whether rights of parties with reference to 
subject mat ter of action had been adjudicated. 
State v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 36 Utah 
223, 102 P. 868(1909). 
Jurisdic t ion of appellate court. 
— Amount in controversy. 
Where plaintiff, in action on promissory 
notes, brought m justices' court, prayed for 
judgment in amount which was within justice's 
jurisdiction, held that, notwithstanding jus-
tice's error in rendering judgment for plaintiff 
judgment was allowed to expire, and judgment 
was then renewed, lien of first judgment ex-
pired, mortgage lien attached as first lien, and 
sale on second judgment could not affect mort-
gage lien. Smith v. Schwartz, 21 Utah 126, 60 P. 
305, 81 Am. St. R. 670 (1899). 
in amount in excess of jurisdictional amount, 
which error was caused by justice's including in 
judgment interest which had accumulated on 
notes after action was begun, district court 
might properly, on defendants' appeal, have 
rendered judgment for plaintiff for any amount 
which was found due on notes, and which was 
within justice's jurisdiction, and, in addition, 
for all interest which had accumulated on such 
amount after commencement of action in jus-
tices' court. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. 
v. Marchant, 11 Utah 68, 39 P. 483 (1895). 
— Lack of jur i sd ic t ion in jus t i ce court. 
District court was required to reverse if jus-
tices' court had no jurisdiction because wrong 
venue was shown. Kansas City Hdwe. Co. v. 
Neilson, 10 Utah 27, 36 P. 131 (1894). 
When subject mat ter of suit was not within 
jurisdiction of justice, it was not within juris-
diction of district court on appeal. Hamner v. 
B.K. Bloch & Co., 16 Utah 436, 52 P. 770, 67 
Am. St. R. 643 (1898). 
Where justices' court had been completely 
ousted of all jurisdiction over case, except for 
purpose of transferring case to some other 
justices' court, distiict court could not acquire 
jurisdiction by appeal. State v. Third Judicial 
Dist. Court, 36 Utah 68, 104 P. 750 (1909); 
Wheatley v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 49 Utah 
105, 162 P. 86(1916). 
Where justice of peace court was without 
jurisdiction of subject matter of action com-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace Key Numbers . — Justices of the Peace «=» 
§ 123(7). 131, 138(10). 
78-5-120. Trial de novo in district court. 
Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court, 
whether rendered by default or after trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the 
district court of the county as provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-120, enacted by L. trict court" for "circuit court." 
1989, ch. 157, § 29; 1996, ch . 198, § 60. Cross-References . - Jurisdiction of dis-
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- trict court, Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 5. 
ment, effective July 1, 1996, substituted udis-
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menced therein, appellate court to which case justices'court was to be determined with regard 
was appealed did not acquire jurisdiction, even to law at time of appeal. State v. Third Judicial 
though it would have had original jurisdiction Dist. Court, 32 Utah 418, 91 P. 133 (1907) 
of subject matter. Burt & Cariquist Co. v. 
Marks, 53 Utah 77, 177 P. 224 (1918). Par t i e s ent i t led to appeal . 
- Waiver of object ions . _
 Q n e o f g e y e r a l d e f e n d a n t s . 
Consent ing that c a s e be set for trial. Where action could have been prosecuted 
While party could waive irregularities in tak- against only one of defendants, and judgment 
ing of appeal and service of notices by express was rendered against all, any one of defendants 
or unequivocal act, he did not waive jurisdic- could appeal from judgment to district court 
tional defects on appeal from justice's court by and have case tried there as though he were 
consenting tha t case be set for trial after mo- only defendant. Nicolo v. Evans, 57 Utah 526, 
tion to dismiss appeal had been overruled. 195 P. 202 (1921). 
Steele & Co. v. Third Dist. Court, 41 Utah 402, 
126 P. 321 (1912). Statutory compl iance . 
Final j u d g m e n t Appeals from justices' courts were purely 
Where parties, on appeal to court having statutory, and s tatutes granting them were to 
original jurisdiction of subject matter, submit- £ J * l e a s t T substantially c^Po% nwl^' 
ted controversy for trial and adjudication, and H ^ a n V' L e W 1 S ' 3 1 U t a h 1 < 9 ' 8 ? R 1 6 7 
cause proceeded to trial and final judgment, (190b). 
they would be held to have waived their right to T h e r i S h t o f appeal from justices' courts to 
object to jurisdiction of appellate court. Burt & district courts was guaranteed by constitution 
Cariquist Co. v. Marks, 53 Utah 77, 177 P. 224 l t s e lf» b u t t h e exercise of such right depended 
(1918). upon substantial compliance with statute 
State v Third Judicial Dist Court, 36 Utah 
- W h e n determined.
 2 67 , 103 P 261 (1909) 
Jurisdiction of district court of appeal from 
I COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. J u r 2d Justices of the Key Numbers . — Justices of the Peace c=> 
Peace § 82 et seq 140 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 51 C J S. Justices of the Peace 
§ 126 et seq 
78-5-121. Docket to be kept — Enumeration of entries 
required. 
Every justice court judge shall keep or cause to be kept a docket. The 
following information shall be entered in the docket under the title of the 
action to which it relates: 
(1) the title to every action or proceeding; 
(2) the object of the action or proceeding, and the amount of any money 
claimed; 
(3) the date of the service of the summons and the time of its return; 
(4) a s tatement of the fact if an order to arrest the defendant is made or 
a writ of at tachment is issued; 
(5) the time when the parties or any party appears, or a party's 
nonappearance, if default is made; 
(6) minutes of the pleadings and motions in writing by referring to 
them, and if not in writing, by a concise statement of the material parts of 
the pleadings; 
(7) every adjournment, stating on whose application and to what time; 
(8) a demand for a trial by jury, when made, by whom, and the order for 
the jury; 
(9) the time appointed for the return of the jury and for the trial; 
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78-5-105. Jurisdiction of justice court and juvenile court. 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over traffic misdemeanors and infrac-
tions committed by persons 16 or 17 years of age and that occur within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court, except those offenses exclusive to the 
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104. 
(2) If the traffic offense involves the conviction of a person 16 years of age or 
older but younger than 18 years of age for an offense under Section 78-3a-506, 
the justice court judge shall notify the juvenile court of the conviction. 
(3) The justice court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and 
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for 
suspension under Section 53-3-221. 
(4) Justice court judges may transfer matters within the court's jurisdiction 
under this section to the juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings according 
to rules of the Judicial Council. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 78-5-105, e n a c t e d by L. § 12; 1996, ch . 1, § 88; 1997, ch . 365, § 49. 
1989, ch . 157, § 14; 1989, ch. 150, $ 6; 1989, Amendment Notes . — The 1997 amend-
ch. 188, § 9; 1990, ch. 59, § 32; 1991, ch. 268, ment, effective March 21, 1997, substi tuted 
$ 40; 1993, ch . 234, § 392; 1995, ch . 277, tt78-3a-506" for "78-3a-517* in Subsection (2). 
78-5-120. Trial de novo in district court. 
Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court, 
whether rendered by default or after trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the 
district court of the county as provided by law. The judgment after trial de novo 
may not be appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a s ta tu te 
or ordinance. 
His to ry : C. 1953, 78-5-120, e n a c t e d by L. ment, effective July 1, 1997, added the last 
1989, ch . 157, § 29; 1996, ch . 198, § 60; 1997, sentence specifying when judgment affer trial 
ch. 215, $ 17. de novo may be appealed. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1997 amend-
78-5-127. Required annual training — Expenses — Fail-
ure to attend. 
(1) Prior to assuming office all justice court judges shall attend an orienta-
tion seminar conducted under the direction of the Judicial Council. 
(2) All justice court judges shall attend the continuing education conducted 
under the supervision of the Judicial Council each calendar year. 
(a) Successful completion of the continuing education requirement 
includes instruction regarding competency and understanding of consti-
tutional provisions and laws relating to the jurisdiction of the court, rules 
of evidence, and rules of civil and criminal procedure as indicated by a 
certificate awarded by the Judicial Council. 
(b) The county or municipality creating and maintaining a justice court 
shall assume the expenses of travel, meals, and lodging for the judge to 
attend education and training seminars conducted by the Judicial Council. 
(3) Any judge not obtaining a certificate for two consecutive years may be 
removed from office for cause under this section. 
(4) The Judicial Council shall inform the Judicial Conduct Commission of 
the names of justice court judges failing to comply with this section. 
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Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
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be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Depositions. 
Discretion of court. 
Failure to request discovery. 
In general. 
Noncompliance. 
—Factors considered. 
Nondisclosure. 
—No reversal. 
—No violation of rule. 
—Remedies. 
—Violation of rule. 
—Waiver of error. 
Physical evidence. 
—Stolen property. 
Required disclosure. 
—State. 
Voluntary prosecutorial response. 
Witnesses. 
Cited. 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure, 
a prosecutor 8 failure to disclose newly discov-
ered inculpatory information which falis 
within the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the 
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to 
cause prejudicial error. State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Depositions. 
This rule did not support defendant's argu-
ment that he was entitled to depose witnesses 
whose testimony had not been transcribed at 
the preliminary hearing, held ten years ear-
lier, or whose memory was central to their tes-
timony; Rule 14(h) exclusively governs the 
taking of depositions in criminal cases. State v. 
Willett, 273 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995). 
Discretion of court. 
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in 
granting or refusing discovery and inspection, 
and its determinations on this subject will not 
be overturned on appeal unless the court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026 (Utah 1982); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other 
grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 
1987). 
Subdivision (g) grants a trial court ample 
discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party 
resulting from a breach of the criminal discov-
ery rules. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1989). 
Failure to request discovery. 
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's 
failure to provide him with a police report de-
scribing a witness' testimony prior to trial was 
not entertained, no request for discovery, writ-
ten or oral, being made at any time. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
To show that defense counsel's failure to 
move for formal discovery was ineffective as-
sistance and prejudicial, defendant had to show 
that filing a formal discovery motion would 
have yielded exculpatory information that was 
not supplied under informal discovery pursu-
ant to the prosecutor's "open file policy." Par-
sons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994). 
In general. 
Discovery powers are conferred upon both 
the circuit courts and the district courts. State 
v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983). 
Although defendant cited U.R.Cr.P. 16 to 
support his argument that he was entitled to 
depose witnesses whose testimony had not 
been transcribed at the preliminary hearing, 
held ten years earlier, or whose memory was 
central to their testimony, Subdivision (h) of 
this rule exclusively governs the taking of de-
positions in criminal cases and defendant 
failed to show how his circumstances fell 
within the requirements of Subdivision (h). 
State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218 (Utah 1995). 
Noncompliance. 
The crux of a Subdivision (g) motion is a re-
quirement that the moving party show that the 
other party has failed to furnish discovery as 
required by the rule. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 
415 (Utah 1989). 
—Factors considered. 
In ruling on a motion to exclude prosecution 
evidence because of a failure to make a full and 
accurate response to a defendant's request, a 
trial judge must consider and weigh a number 
of factors, such as (1) the extent to which the 
prosecution's representation is actually inaccu-
rate, (2) the tendency of the omission or mis-
statement to lead defense counsel into tactics 
or strategy that could prejudice the outcome, 
(3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting 
pertinent information or misstating the facts, 
and (4) the extent to which appropriate defense 
investigation would have discovered the omit-
ted or misstated evidence. The prosecution has 
a duty to make a correct and complete disclo-
sure, but defense counsel also has an affirma-
tive duty to make a reasonable investigation. 
State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994). 
Nondisclosure. 
—No reversal. 
In a trial for murder, the prosecution's fail-
ure to provide discovery material concerning 
testimony regarding the defendant's carrying a 
scabbard did not require reversal since a cura-
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tive order adequately advised the jury about 
the inadmissibility and questionable nature of 
the testimony and, moreover, there was no in-
ference at trial that defendant actually used 
the knife. Thus, the testimony was not so prej-
udicial as to undermine confidence in the ver-
dict as there was no substantial likelihood that 
the outcome would have been different without 
it. State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 476, 126 L. 
Ed. 2d 427 (1993). 
—No violation of rule. 
State's failure to disclose to defendant before 
trial certain jail records which corroborated de-
fendant's testimony that he requested medical 
treatment while in jail did not violate defen-
dant's discovery rights where there was no 
showing in record from which it could be fairly 
inferred that prosecution knew or should have 
known that defendant's request for medical 
treatment would ever be an issue or of any im-
portance at trial. State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1984). 
—Remedies. 
Dismissal for a discovery violation is proper 
only when all other attempts to mitigate dam-
age caused by the unexpected evidence have 
failed. State v. Christoflerson, 793 P.2d 944 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Violation of rule. 
In a battery prosecution, the government's 
complete failure to respond in any way to a 
discovery request denied the defendant a rea-
sonable opportunity to compel discovery of the 
criminal record of the prosecution's only wit-
ness, relieved the defense of any responsibility 
to show ugood cause," and was prejudicial error 
warranting reversal and remand for a new 
trial. Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Waiver of error. 
Where the trial court, after denying a motion 
to comple discovery, indicated that it would 
consider a request to continue the trial date if 
necessary, defendant, by not requesting a con-
tinuance at that point, essentially waived his 
right to claim error later. State v. Larson, 775 
P.2d 415 (Utah 1989). 
The defendant's failure to mitigate the im-
pact of unexpected testimony resulting from a 
discovery violation by objecting to its admis-
sion or moving for either a continuance or a 
mistrial precluded his claim that it was error 
to deny his motion to dismiss. State v. 
ChristorTerson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990;. 
Physical evidence. 
—Stolen property. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
I COLLATERAL 
Utah Law Review. — Comment, Confron-
tation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 75. 
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 486 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Right of accused in state courts to 
denying motion to produce stolen automobile 
for inspection by defendant charged with auto-
mobile theft where the automobile had been 
released and returned to its owner over three 
months before defendant's request for its pro-
duction and there was no showing of its eviden-
tiary significance to the defense. State v. Knill, 
656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1982). 
Required disclosure. 
—State. 
Due process requires the state to disclose 
even unrequested information which is or may 
be exculpatory. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 
(Utah 1988). 
Voluntary prosecutorial response. 
There are two requirements that the prose-
cution must meet when it responds voluntarily 
to a request for discovery. First, the prosecu-
tion either must produce all of the material 
requested or must identify explicitly those por-
tions of the request with respect to which no 
responsive material will be provided. Secondly, 
when the prosecution agrees to produce any of 
the material requested, it must continue to dis-
close such material on an ongoing basis to the 
defense. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 
1987). 
Witnesses. 
A circuit court judge acted well within his 
discretion in ordering the state to disclose the 
identity of a witness and the details of a crimi-
nal transaction the circuit court found to be 
material to a pending criminal prosecution, 
where the state itself provided "good cause," 
for purposes of Subdivision (a)(5), by represent-
ing that it needed to keep defendant's money to 
use at trial, when the only logical use of the 
money would of necessity entail proof of the 
details of the transaction in which the infor-
mant was involved. Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 
740 (Utah 1984). 
After the defendant injected a degree of sur-
prise into the proceedings, the State reacted 
properly by contacting a rebuttal witness 
known to have some expertise in the relevant 
area and notifying defense cousel as soon as 
possible who he was and what his general pur-
pose would be. Therefore, the state was not 
precluded from calling this rebuttal witness 
not disclosed before trial in circumstances 
where it, in good faith, had no reason to expect 
the need for the witness before trial. State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Cited in State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751 (Utah 
1984); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1987); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1988); State v. Sawyers, 819 P.2d 806 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 
(Utah 1994). 
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state grand jury, 20 A.L.R.3d 7. of complainant in sexual offense prosecution, 
Interference by prosecution with defense 45 A.L.R.4th 310. 
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 W g h o f d e f e n d a n t i n c r i m i n a l contempt pro-
nesses before trial in state court, 2 A.L.R4th
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Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defen-
dant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the 
time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had 
been present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good 
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous con-
duct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury 
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecu-
tion. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written.demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified 
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the 
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally 
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any 
number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in 
the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecu-
tion has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
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court to amend records of court, reciting grant-
ing of motion by district attorney to dismiss 
criminal action and discharging accused from 
custody, so as to read that information was dis-
missed, and not that action was dismissed and 
defendant discharged, since court had power, 
on its own motion, or on motion of district at-
torney, to dismiss action, information, or in-
dictment. State ex rel. Barnes v. Second Dist. 
Court, 36 Utah 396, 104 P. 282 (1909). 
Purpose of statute which provided that rea-
sons for dismissal of criminal action must have 
been set forth in order entered upon the 
minutes was that all might know what invoked 
court's discretion and whether its action was 
justified. Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 
32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967). 
Good cause for delay. 
Defendant, who was charged at a time he 
had other case pending against him and in one 
of those cases requested and received psychiat-
ric examination and who was appointed vari-
ous counsel because of necessity and at his own 
request, was not denied right to speedy trial 
where he was held sane on August 14, 1969 
and trial was initially set for January 7, 1970 
and commenced on April 8, 1970, after disposi-
tion of defendant's motion to dismiss made on 
January 7. State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 
478 P.2d 326 (1970). 
Magistrate's authority to dismiss. 
City court judge acting as a committing mag-
istrate upon a preliminary examination did not 
have authority to dismiss criminal proceed-
ings. Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1977). 
Offense improperly alleged. 
In prosecution for rape of female under 18 
years of age, where defendant was given pre-
liminary examination on complaint charging 
rape had been committed on April 1, and infor-
mation charged rape on that date, but proof 
showed that female was then over 18 years of 
age, and state promptly introduced evidence of 
prior acts of intercourse before female became 
18, conviction could not be upheld since defen-
dant was not given benefit of preliminary ex-
amination for offense for which he was con-
victed. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 
1000 (1909). 
Reasonableness of delay. 
Fact that information was not filed within 30 
days after defendant's commitment, did not en-
title defendant to discharge, where good cause 
for delay was shown. State v. Reynolds, 24 
Utah 29, 66 P. 614 (1901). 
Review of bindover orders. 
A district court's jurisdiction over a motion 
to quash a bindover order follows from the au-
thorization in Subdivision (a) of dismissal of 
indictments and informations. The motion 
focuses a district court's attention on the pro-
priety of its exercise of original jurisdiction, 
requiring a determination of whether it can 
proceed with the case. The motion is not equiv-
alent to an appeal. State v. Humphrey, 823 
P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
Statutes not in conflict 
There was no conflict between statutes pro-
viding for dismissal of and bar to further prose-
cutions against a sole defendant for misde-
meanors only and other statutes providing for 
dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions, 
whether felony or misdemeanor, against one of 
several joint defendants for purpose of allowing 
dismissed to be witness for the state. In re 
Petty, 18 Utah 2d 320, 422 P.2d 659 (1967). 
Subsequent prosecution. 
Where district court erroneously dismissed 
ordinance violation prosecution on appeal from 
city court but before arraignment and trial de 
novo in district court and that order of dismis-
sal was later reversed by the Supreme Court, 
subsequent prosecution of defendant in district 
court for the ordinance violation was not "any 
other prosecution" within the bar of this sec-
tion, it was merely the same prosecution which 
had never been begun de novo in the district 
court and thus was not barred. Boyer v. Lar-
son, 20 Utah 2d 121, 433 P.2d 1015 (1967). 
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A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute 
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon 
settlement of civil liability growing out of act 
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315. 
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or 
prosecution because of failure of jury to agree 
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274. 
What constitutes "manifest necessity" for 
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing 
subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having at-
tached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014. 
When does delay in imposing sentence vio-
late speedy trial provision, 86 A.L.R.4th 340. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 574, 
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Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
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(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in 
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another 
appeal may be, and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence 
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days 
of the filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed 
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on 
appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate brief. Appellant 
reply briefs shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's 
brief. 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to 
each party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing 
extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension. 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to 
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief. 
Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme 
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a 
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be enter-
tained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted, 
when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or 
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the 
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has 
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
Supreme Court. 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 416 
(11) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, 
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under this rule. 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court under this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the district court. The decision of the 
district court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court; 
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court 
shall transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the 
original pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, 
and the notice and undertaking on appeal; 
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; or 
(d) all further proceedings are in the district court, including any pro-
cess required to enforce judgment. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
ment deleted former Subdivision (11), relating 
to procedure in appeals from circuit courts; re-
designated former Subdivisions (12) and (13) 
as (11) and (12); substituted "district court" for 
"circuit court" throughout Subdivision (12); 
and substituted "Criminal Procedure" for 
"Court Procedure" in Subdivision (12)(c). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule governs ap-
peals from district and juvenile courts. The 
practice and procedure for taking such appeals, 
including the time in which the appeal is filed, 
are prescribed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Cross-References. — Appeals from justice 
court to district court, § 78-5-120. 
Appeals to Court of Appeals, § 78-4-11. 
Appellate jurisdiction of district courts, Utah 
Const., Art. VIE, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4. 
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, 
Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2. 
Dismissal if affidavit of impecuniosity is 
untrue, § 21-7-7. 
Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 
12. 
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah Const, 
Art. I, Sec. 12; § 77-1-6. 
Right of indigent accused to counsel on ap-
peal, § 77-32-1 et seq. 
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Cited. 
Appeal by defendant 
A purported second judgment and sentence, 
which was clearly an attempt to render a judg-
ment in criminal proceeding which if valid 
would have affected defendant's rights, was ap-
pealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14, 
386 P.2d 411 (1963). 
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights pro-
tected by the double jeopardy guarantee neces-
sitate review on appeal before a second trial if 
defendant is to enjoy full protection of the 
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1979). 
Appeal by prosecution. 
District court's judgment, discharging defen-
dant in criminal prosecution and releasing his 
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was 
final judgment from which state might appeal 
State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899) 
State had right of appeal from judgment dis-
charging defendant, in prosecution for felony, 
on ground that information did not state facts 
sufficient to constitute public offense. State v 
McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 P. 815 (1902). 
The state had no right to appeal sentence 
imposed upon defendant since the imposition of 
sentence was part of the judgment, and not an 
order made after judgment. State v. Kelbach, 
569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977). 
This section does not authorize the prosecu-
tion to appeal an acquittal, no matter how 
overwhelming the evidence against the defen-
dant may be. State v. Museehnan, 667 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Where dismissal of charge was based on trial 
court's construction of the applicable law be-
fore the court ruled on the sufficiency of the 
evidence to convict, the ruling was, in effect, a 
"final judgment of dismissal" under Subdivi-
sion (3)(a) and therefore was appealable even 
though the ruling was made at the close of all 
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the evidence. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
The state may not, following a pretrial rul-
ing suppressing some state's evidence, request 
dismissal of a criminal case in order to avoid 
the discretionary appeal provisions of Subdivi-
sion (3)(e) and to obtain an appeal of right un-
der Subdivision (3)(a). State v. Waddoups, 712 
P.2d 223 (Utah 1985). 
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the 
ground that the prosecution has not proved an 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt is in substance an acquittal and there-
fore is not appealable. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1988). 
State could not appeal an order granting de-
fendant a new trial after he moved to arrest 
judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial 
where the trial court did not, in substance, 
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
An appeal from the denial of a motion for 
new trial is not an appeal by the state permit-
ted by Subdivision (3), because the state's ap-
peal is not an appeal from a "final judgment of 
dismissal." An appeal by the state properly lies 
only from the order of dismissal and does not 
lie from the denial of a motion for new trial. 
State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
—Dismissals. 
The language "a final judgment of dismissal" 
in Subdivision (3)(a) refers to dismissals where 
the trial court construes the applicable law be-
fore ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence to 
convict and before a final judgment. State v. 
Amador, 804 P.2d 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Subdivision (3) precludes appeals from 
postjudgment dismissals or vacations. State v. 
Amador, 804 P.2d 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In a trial for possession of a controlled sub-
stance where, after all the evidence was in and 
both sides presented closing arguments, the de-
fendant renewed his motion to suppress evi-
dence, which was granted, the order appealed 
from was an acquittal and not a "dismissal" as 
that term is used in Subdivision (3)(a) of this 
rule, and was not subject to appeal by the state. 
State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Appealability. 
To determine whether an appealed decision 
falls within one of the enumerated categories 
of appealable rulings, the appellate court looks 
to the substance of the ruling and not to the 
label attached by a trial judge. State v. Work-
man, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff d, 
852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
Applicability of civil rules. 
—Court findings. 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. (effect of court findings) 
applies in criminal cases by virtue of Subdivi-
sion (7) of this rule. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 52, U.R.C.P. (findings by the court) ap-
plies to criminal actions. State v. Goodman, 
763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Attorney's failure to file notice. 
Where if, within the statutory period for ap-
peal, defendant has requested counsel to take 
an appeal and counsel gave defendant reason 
*to believe that he would but then failed to do 
so, the remedy to establish the denial of his 
right to appeal is not in the Supreme Court but 
by a motion for relief under Rule 65B(i), 
U.R.C.P. in the sentencing court. State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). 
If it is found upon a hearing that a defendant 
was induced, by reason of his attorney's repre-
sentation that an appeal would be perfected, to 
allow his time to take an appeal to expire, or 
that he was misled as to his right to appeal, the 
defendant should be resentenced nunc pro tunc 
upon previous finding of guilt so as to afford 
*him an opportunity of prosecuting and perfect-
ing an appeal, since the time for taking such 
appeal would date from the rendition of the 
new judgment. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 
(Utah 1981). 
Bind over orders. 
Subdivision (2)(c) governs all appeals from 
bind over orders entered in any court. State v. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant, a juvenile whose preliminary ex-
amination was conducted in district court 
rather than in circuit court, was not denied the 
right to review of the bind over order by a su-
perior court, since he had the same right under 
Subdivision (2)(c) to seek review as does any 
other criminal defendant. State v. Schreuder, 
712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
Death penalty cases. 
While Utah law does not compel a defendant 
sentenced to death to go through every proce-
dure that a defendant might voluntarily in-
voke, the law does require one automatic ap-
peal even when "the defendant has chosen not 
to pursue his own appeal." State v. Holland, 
777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989). 
Execution of criminal defendant may not oc-
cur until the Supreme Court determines at 
least that the sentence is in accord with lawful 
process. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1989). 
Given the procedures required at trial and 
the careful appellate review given by the Su-
preme Court to death penalty cases over the 
years, a specification of reasons by the sentenc-
ing authority on the record for imposing the 
death penalty, even if it were practicable, is 
not necessary to prevent arbitrary and capri-
cious sentences. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 
1019 (Utah 1989). 
Double jeopardy. 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss 
based upon former jeopardy defense was not a 
final judgment from which an appeal could be 
taken. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 
1978). 
Habeas corpus ruling. 
District court's ruling on habeas corpus peti-
tion was final, appealable judgment. Winno-
vich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988 (1908). 
Justice court. 
Under Subdivision (13)(a), the Court of Ap-
peals has jurisdiction over a criminal matter 
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originating in a justice court only when the 
validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or 
statute has been raised in the justice court. An 
oblique reference on appeal to constitutional 
rights or the invalidity of defendant's convic-
tion cannot satisfy the statutory requirement. 
Without specifying the statute challenged and 
the legal basis, a mere allegation of a violation 
of one's constitutional rights is insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), affd, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert, denied, 
498 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 89 
(1990). 
The right to an "appeal" from a court not of 
record is satisfied by provision for a trial de 
novo in a court of record. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P 2d 513 (Utah), cert, denied, 
498 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 89 
(1990). 
Notice of appeal. 
Unless record on appeal showed that notice 
of appeal was served upon district attorney or 
his assistant, appeal would be dismissed. Peo-
ple v. Fennel, 4 Utah 112, 7 P. 525 (1885). 
Oral statements from bench. 
Oral statements made from the bench are 
not the judgment of the case and therefore are 
not appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1978). 
Reversal of order arresting judgment. 
If a jury verdict of guilty is set aside by an 
order of a trial judge pursuant to a motion in 
arrest of judgment, that order may be appealed 
pursuant to Subdivision (2)(b), and if reversed, 
the guilty verdict is reinstated. State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Review of acquittal prohibited. 
An appellate court may not reassess an ac-
quittal even though the acquittal was made 
under an incorrect application of the law or an 
improper determination of the facts. State v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Review of evidence. 
The defendant's motion for dismissal having 
been granted, in analyzing the evidence to see 
if a case could be made out against him, it was 
reviewed by the Supreme Court in the light 
most favorable to the state. State v. Brennan, 
13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962). 
Time for appeal. 
Time within which appeal must be taken 
was jurisdictional. Sullivan v. District Court, 
65 Utah 400, 237 P. 516 (1925). 
The 30-day period for filing a notice of ap-
peal in a criminal case is jurisdictional and 
cannot be enlarged by the Supreme Court. 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). 
Cited in McRae & DeLand v. Feltch, 669 
P.2d 404 (Utah 1983); State v. Wright, 744 
P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Matus, 
789 P.2d 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. 
Menzies, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992). 
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Utah Law Review. — The Confession of 
Error, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 286. 
C.J.S. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1660 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — When criminal case becomes moot 
so as to preclude review of or attack on convic-
tion or sentence, 9 A.L.R.3d 462. 
Appealability of orders or rulings, prior to 
final judgment in criminal case, as to accused's 
mental competency, 16 A.L.R.3d 714. 
Court's presentence inquiry as to, or consid-
eration of, accused's intention to appeal as 
error, 64 A.L.R.3d 1226. 
Validity and effect of criminal defendant's 
express waiver of right to appeal as part of ne-
gotiated plea agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864. 
Appeal by state of order granting new trial 
in criminal case, 95 A.L.R.3d 596. 
Judgment favorable to convicted criminal 
defendant in subsequent civil action arising 
out of same offense as ground for reversal of 
conviction, 96 A.L.R.3d 1174. 
Waiver or estoppel in incompetent legal rep-
resentation cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 807 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding appellate and post-
conviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582. 
Presence of alternate juror in jury room as 
ground for reversal of state criminal convic-
tion, 15 A.L.R.4th 1127. 
Appealability of order suspending imposition 
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R.4th 939. 
Abatement effects of accused's death before 
appellate review of federal criminal conviction, 
80 A.L.R. Fed. 446. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=* 1004 et 
seq. 
Rule 27. Stays pending appeal. 
(a) (1) A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for 
other relief is pending. 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if an 
appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued. 
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order of judg-
ment in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good 
cause pending disposition of the appeal. 
(b) A person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a 
term of incarceration in jail or prison, and who has filed a notice of appeal, 
shall be detained, unless the trial judge issues a certificate of probable cause 
and determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not 
likely to flee during pendency of the appeal and that the defendant will not 
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Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces-
sity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Indictments and 
errors, U.ILCr.P. 4. 
informations, harmless 
ANALYSIS 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
Harmless error. 
Minor defect. 
Substantial right affected. 
—State's burden of persuasion. 
Variances. 
Cited. 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Even though admission of photographs of 
manslaughter victim served only to create 
emotional impact on jury, their admission was 
not reversible error; they were not so gruesome 
or offensive that their absence would have re-
sulted in a more favorable outcome for defen-
dant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979). 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
The defendant's due process right of allocu-
tion was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held 
in his presence, where he was addressed by the 
judge and elected to speak, and an amended 
judgment subsequently entered by the trial 
court, at which the defendant was not present 
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a 
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence. 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988). 
Harmless error. 
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge 
of female under age of 18 years, although it 
was error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts 
of sexual intercourse after one relied on for 
conviction, such error was not prejudicial to 
defendant so as to require reversal. State v. 
Mattivi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911). 
Where defendant in murder prosecution con-
tested every step taken by state during 
progress of trial and was afforded every oppor-
tunity to defend charge, and his counsel in-
sisted upon every right to which the law enti-
tled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not 
guilty was received on legal holiday did not 
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52 
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918). 
In a prosecution of a state fish and game 
warden for appropriating state money to his 
own use, an instruction in which the court read 
the entire statute on misuse of public money 
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice 
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded. 
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968 
(1922). 
The admission of testimony at trial in viola-
tion of defendant's constitutional confrontation 
rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
where such testimony was merely cumulative. 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982). 
Trial court's instruction that flight from 
scene of crime of aggravated burglary 
amounted to implied admission of guilt was er-
roneous, but was not prejudicial, since there 
was other evidence sufficient to sustain a con-
viction. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 
1983). 
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on 
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional 
right not to take the stand did not require re-
versal where the other evidence of guilt was 
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections 
prevented the prosecutor from making any real 
point of the failure to testify, and the judge's 
quick and decisive admonition to the jury and 
prosecutor further obviated any harm that 
might have resumed from the comments. State 
v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985), overruled 
on other grounds, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986). 
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an 
insurer in the information as comprising an 
element of aggravated arson was harmless 
error, where a correct instruction on the sub-
ject was later given to the jury immediately 
before their deliberations, to which no objec-
tion was taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P 2d 
510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Admission of defendant's prior offenses was 
harmless error as there was no reasonable like-
lihood of a more favorable result without the 
admission of the prior bad acts evidence. State 
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). 
Minor defect. 
Conviction for fornication would not be re-
versed because information charged defendant 
with having committed offense with one 
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, where 
identity of woman was sufficiently established 
State v. Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P. 89 
(1912). 
Substantial right affected. 
Court could not reverse judgment unless 
some substantial right of defendant had been 
invaded. State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P 
271 (1918). 
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on 
appeal merely because some error or irregular-
ity may have occurred, but will be overturned 
only if the error or irregularity is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its ab-
sence there would have been a different result. 
State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982); 
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State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989). 
Where preprinted form affidavit in support 
of a search warrant was left blank concerning 
the date of the informant's observations and 
the date the information was given to the affi-
ant, any defect in the affidavit caused by the 
blanks was required to be disregarded where 
the defendants did not contend the blanks in 
any way infringed upon their substantial 
rights. State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 
1983). 
For an error to require reversal, the likeli-
hood of a different outcome must be sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in the verdict. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 198ft, 
aiTd, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), competency 
evaluation found invalid and conviction va-
cated, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Jury verdict would not be upset when there 
was no indication that trial court's improper 
action in reassigning the case without a writ-
ten order of the court affected defendant's 
rights. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 
1988). 
The Supreme Court's standard for dealing 
with non-constitutional error is that the court 
will not reverse a conviction unless the error is 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its ab-
sence there would have been a more favorable 
result for the defendant. State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989). 
Admission of witness's hypnotically en-
hanced testimony was harmful error at defen-
dant's trial for first-degree murder because, 
without such testimony, there was a reason-
able likelihood that the outcome would have 
been more favorable for defendant, i.e., he 
might have been convicted of second degree 
murder or some other lesser included offense. 
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989) 
—State's burden of persuasion. 
When the defendant can make a credible 
agrument that the prosecutor's errors have im-
paired the defense, it is up to the state to per-
suade the court that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome 
of trial would have been more favorable for the 
defendant. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 
1987). 
Defendant's conviction of aggravated rob-
bery was reversed where the state failed to per-
suade the Supreme Court that the defense was 
not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of inculpa-
tory evidence and, absent the prosecutor's 
errors, there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for defendant. State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law and Procedure, 
1995 Utah L. Rev. 1. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate 
Review §§ 705, 711. 
Variances. 
There could not be said to be any legal vari-
ance between the proof and the allegation 
when the allegation was immaterial, and 
might be treated as surplusage. United States 
v. Kershaw, 5 Utah 618, 19 P. 194 (1888). 
On prosecution for stealing sheep, variance 
between commitment which stated that sheep 
were common property of 10 individuals, and 
information which charged several ownership 
of sheep in six of same individuals was not fa-
tal, since it appeared from statements in com-
mitment and those in information that each 
was intended to charge the same offense — 
same transaction. State v. McKee, 17 Utah 
370, 53 P. 733 (1898). 
In prosecution for forgery, there was no fatal 
variance between allegation that bank de-
frauded was Commercial National Bank and 
proof that corporate name of bank was Com-
mercial National Bank of Salt Lake City. State 
v. Brown, 39 Utah 140,115 P. 994,1913E Ann. 
Cas. 1 (1911). 
Where defendant was charged by informa-
tion with eight counts of theft from a sole pro-
prietorship but was convicted on evidence 
showing that he had stolen funds from a pool of 
unnamed third party investors who had en-
trusted their money to the proprietorship, his 
conviction was reversed on the ground that 
such variance clearly prejudiced him in the 
preparation and conduct of his defense on the 
merits. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 
1985). 
Cited in State v Schaffer, 638 P 2d 1185 
(Utah 1981); State v. Watts, 639 P 2d 158 
(Utah 1981); State v. Casarez. 656 P 2d 1005 
(Utah 1982); State v. Benson, 712 P 2d 256 
(Utah 1985); State v. Kay, 717 P 2d 1294 (Utah 
1986); State v. Wade, 725 P 2d 1316 (Utah 
1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1986); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 
1986); State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459 OJtah 
1989); State v. Pacheco, 778 P 2d 26 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 784 P 2d 1135 
(Utah 1989); State v. Cude. 7S4 P 2d 1197 
(Utah 1989); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ontiveros, 835 
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
gagging, shackling, or otherwise physically re-
straining accused during course of state crimi-
nal trial, 90 A.L.R.3d 17. 
Modern status of law regarding cure of error, 
in instruction as to one offense, by conviction of 
higher or lesser offense, 15 A.L.R.4th 118. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 31 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 428 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law **» 1162 et 
seq. 
Rule 31. Rules of court. 
(1) District courts may make local rules for the conduct of criminal proceed-
ings not inconsistent with these rules and statutes of the state. Copies of all 
rules made by a court shall, upon promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme 
Court and to the Judicial Council and shall be made available to members of 
the state bar and the public. 
(2) If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed 
in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or statutes. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Cross-References. — Judicial Council, 
ment added the subdivision designations and Utah Const, Art. VIII, Sec. 12. 
deleted provisions for rules of circuit courts. Utah State Bar, § 78-51-1 et seq. 
Rule 32. Minute entry. 
The case file shall include copies of all minute entries of proceedings and 
orders made in that case. 
Rule 33. Regulation of conduct in the courtroom. 
The court may make appropriate orders regulating the conduct of officers, 
parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any pro-
ceeding. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential- in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. A.L.IUth 1196. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
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DENNIS L. JUDD - 1762 
RACHELLE LONDON PALMER - 6921 
Daggett County Attorneys 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
461 West 200 South 
Vernal, Utah 04070 
Telephone: (001) 709-5359 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAGGETT STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
DAVID A. HINSON, : 
: CASE NO. CR-276 
Defendant. 
THIS matter came before the Court for a pretrial conference 
on June 6, 1997, with the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding. 
The defendant appeared and was represented by D. Bruce Oliver. The 
State was represented by Rachelle L. Palmer. 
The Defendant appeared before the Justice Court Judge on or 
about September 25, 1996 and plead guilty to his charges and then 
filed his Notice of Appeal with the Justice Court on or about 
October 10, 1996. The State of Utah filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Appeal which was still pending before the 
court. The District Court ruled that the Defendant was allowed a 
trial de novo over the objections of the State of Utah that a trial 
de novo was not appropriate since the Defendant had entered a 
guilty plea and had not moved to withdraw that guilty plea. 
The Court next addressed Defendant's Request for Discovery. 
The request was submitted to the State on or about March 25, 1997. 
The State had not sent a reply as of the date of the pretrial 
conference. No other efforts had been made by the Defendant to 
obtain the response to discovery. The Defendant's attorney had not 
called the County Attorney nor written a letter in order to obtain 
a response to discovery. The defendant made an oral motion to 
dismiss the case based on the State's failure to provide discovery 
in a timely manner at the pretrial conference. The Court dismissed 
the case over objections from the State of Utah that the Motion was 
not proper in that the time for answering discovery had not 
expired. 
WHEREFORE, the court orders the following: 
1. Defendant is granted a trial de novo as a result of his 
appeal from Justice Court. 
2 
2. This case is dismissed based on the State's failure to 
provide discovery in a timely manner. 
DATED this ^P\ day of 1 DM\S X^Al997 
Approved as to Form: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Defendant 
rOHN R. ANDERSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment to: D. Bruce Oliver, 
Attorney for Defendant, 100 South 300 West, Suite 210, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 04101-1210. i 
DATED t h i s :vh day of \H 19 <TK 
VtuktLU ji Pd/ruv 
m:\dagl4\dhlnoon.omj 
3 
DENNIS L. JUDD - 17G2 
RACHELLE LONDON PALMER - 6921 
Daggett County Attorneys 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
461 West 200 South 
Vernal, Utah 04070 
Telephone: (001) 709-5359 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAGGETT STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER A11D JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
CYNTHIA HINSON, : 
: CASE NO. CR-277 
Defendant. 
THIS matter came before the Court for a pretrial conference 
on June 6, 1997, with the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding. 
The defendant appeared and was represented by D. Druce Oliver. The 
State was represented by Rachelle L. Palmer. 
The Defendant appeared before the Justice Court Judge on or 
about September 25, 1996 and plead guilty to her charges and then 
filed her Notice of Appeal with the Justice Court on or about 
October 10, 1996. The State of Utah filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Appeal which was utill pending before the 
court. The District Court ruled that the Defendant was allowed a 
trial de novo over the objections of the State of Utah that a trial 
ClMUvmCov DIUIMA IUM 
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de novo was not appropriate since the Defendant had entered a 
guilty plea and had not moved to withdraw that guilty plea. 
The Court next addressed Defendant's Request for Discovery. 
The request was submitted to the State on or about March 25, 1997. 
The State had not sent a reply as of the date of the pretrial 
conference. No other efforts had been made by the Defendant to 
obtain the response to discovery. The Defendant's attorney had not 
called the County Attorney nor written a letter in order to obtain 
a response to discovery. The defendant made an oral motion to 
dismiss the case based on the State's failure to provide discovery 
in a timely manner at the pretrial conference. The Court dismissed 
the case over objections from the State of Utah that the Motion was 
not proper in that the time for answering discovery had not 
expired. 
WHEREFORE, the court orders the following: 
1. Defendant is granted a trial de novo as a result of her 
appeal from Justice Court. 
2 
2. This case is dismissed based on the State's failure to 
provide discovery in a timely manner. 
Approved as to Form: 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney £or Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/ILAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a copy of: the foregoing Order and Judgment to: D. Bruce Oliver, 
Attorney tor Defendant, IBO South 300 West, Suite 210, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 04101-1210. 
DATED this -\\[) day of .LiM . 19 . 
a: \dagl4\cliinooit.oaj 
3 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
STATE OF LAAH 
-O0O-
PLAINTIFF, 
V S . 
HINSON, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CASE NO. CR-276 
CR-277 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
-O0O-
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 6TH DAY OF JUNE, 1 9 9 7 , 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVE-NAMED 
COURT, WAS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON, 
COMMENCING IN THE MORNING SESSION OF SAID DAY AT THE 
DAGGETT COUNTY COURTHOUSE, MANILA, UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
»?/"\T3 ^>» -> —Mrn-r *7*7 
DEPUTY DAGGETT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
4 6 1 WEST 200 SOUTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 3 4 0 7 3 
FOR DEFENDANT: BRUCE OLIVER 
180 SOUTH 300 V7EST, &210 
.? -\ - -r» " "N V " T V T' 
COPY 
THE COURT: OKAY. I HAVE HINSON AND HINSON SET 
n a n a c\jn. ctxci.t^±t\ij . 
3 MR. OLIVER: YOUR HONOR, BRUCE OLIVER APPEARING FOR 
4 THE DEFENDANTS, HINSONS. 
5 THE COURT: IT LOOKS LIKE THIS IS AN APPEAL DE 
7 POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA. 
8 THERE IS A SIMILAR THING WITH CYNTHIA HINSON. THE STATE HAS 
9 FILED A MOTION OPPOSING YOUR APPEAL. I LOOKED AT THESE FILES. 
10 I THINK THE APPEAL WAS TIMELY. AND EVEN THOUGH IT MAY HAVE 
11 BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER A MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE 
12 PLEA, THERE WAS A PLEA, I THINK YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL DE 
13 NOVO, SO I GUESS THE APPEAL IS PROPER. IF I HAVEN'T RULED ON 
14 THAT Y3T, THAT WILL BE MY RULING. 
16 RULED ON THAT, BUT I APPRECIATE THE COURT RULING ON THAT. 
17 THE COURT: SO I GUESS WE NEED A TRIAL DATS. AND 
13 WE NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER THE CASES CAN BE JOINED OR TRIED 
LJ 3Z7ATLATELI. CJL, rtTHER.E A?„E WE? 
~j vlTs.. ^ X J X ^ E X X : JL IxiliUs. 1 1 W<U\JLJLJ Oil .-ijcr-^w-r-rvju.-i^ Ji l w J.^1 
21 THEM SEPARATELY. SECONDLY, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED YET. ANY 
22 DISCOVERY FROM THE STATE. WE HAVE COME UP FOR PRETRIAL. 
23 THERE'S BEEN NO OPPORTUNITY TO TALK OR TO NEGOTIATE AT ALL. 
24 IT'S BEEN SOMEWHAT OF A WASTED TRIP FOR US. WE HAVE COME FROM 
25 SALT LAKE. BOTH THE HINSCNS AND MYSELF HAVE COM3 FROM SALT 
2 
1 LAKE. AND THERE'S BEEN -- DISCOVERY REQUEST WAS FILED ON 
* i.Urtjx\_xi ^ o x n ox4 l n x o JL&rtJX, *i£ijL\~£i rt/io oi ivciM u r t i o / i r T E R wti 
3 RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE ARRAIGNMENT. NOTICE OF THE ARRAIGNMENT 
4 WAS DATED MARCH 13TH --OR MARCH 18TH, IF I AM NOT MISTAKEN, 
5 AND SETTING THE ARRAIGNMENT DATE FOR MARCH 2 8TH. WE ENTERED 
C *^ TTT"> TV n n r i n n ^ ^ T / I T H i M n ^ T »-?-!% /^«*T ^JTH r»r«TT ->r-i-nTT -n • rs\Tt~t •",'TfrnjT ^ T-N I-» O r •* •-» <-> i—• —-»^N.-» 
O O U A *-i xr £" jijrxi" -^vj.<^_ iJj rxx^i^/ xrxji2i4T-i wx* rxc-xxvv^xi i , j i n A U V J U U ^ I i n i-\ x ^ x i y u i i o i c\jss. 
7 DISCOVERY. AND, AS OF YET, WE HAVE RECEIVED NOTHING FROM 
8 THE --
9 THE COURT: HAVE YOU ASKED, CALLED THEM OR SENT 
10 THEM A LETTER OR FOLLOWED UP AT ALL? 
11 MR. OLIVER: NO. THERE'S BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP. SHE 
12 HAS NO REPORTS, EITHER. SHE HAS NOTHING AT ALL. I ASKED HER 
13 THIS MORNING IF I CANNOT SEE THE REPORT. SHE DOESN'T HAVE 
14 ANYTHING IN HER £ 1LE EITHER. SO, AT THIS POINT, YOUR HONOR, 
16 WITH THE DISCOVERY. AND WE ARE HERE FOR PRETRIAL FOR 
17 PURPOSES. IT'S JUST BEEN A WASTED TRIP FOR US, FOR BOTH 
13 HINSONS AND MYSELF. 
19 TliZ ZZ *J~?'7: 'TrJ?-..? -S -VJUR REo7L-N3Z? /LiERj. I J --~-i-
20 STUFF? 
21 MS. PALMJER: YOUR HONOR, WE TRIED TO OBTAIN THE 
22 STUFF. THERE'S BEEN SOMEWHAT OF CONFUSION ABOUT THIS CASE. 
23 THERE WAS A GUILTY PLEA AND, THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS 
24 SHOULD NOT BE TRIAL DE NOVO. THEY ADMITTED TO THEIR GUILT, 
25 AND THAT THEY CAN OBJECT TO THE SENTENCING AMD NOT THE PLEA. 
3 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
ALSO --
MS. PALMER: DISCOVERY IS SUPPOSED TO BE GIVEN IN A 
TIMELY MANNER PRIOR TO TRIAL. THERE IS NO TRIAL. DISCOVERY 
WILL BE PRIOR TO TRIAL. THE RULEf CRIMINAL RULES OF 
r-x%v-/v-iJii-/vjiA.o, rtujjuH r\-rr<. u o i U u i v £ i U I O V ^ U V D ^ I ur* xw i n ^ ii i 'UL o r 
TRIAL. 
MR. OLIVER: WELL, YOUR HONOR, ALSO --
THE COURT: MOTION'S GRANTED. YOU HAVE HAD THIS 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY SINCE MARCH 25TH, AND I DON'T THINK 
THAT'S APPROPRIATE. 
MR. OLIVER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. ARE THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS WS 
HEED TO DEAL WITH? 
•vto D^T.VPTJ. T rpjj"? 3SLI3VE SC. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WE'LL BE IN RECESS. 
21 
22 
23 
1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
*: I, RUSSEL D. MORGAN, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
3 FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE 
4 FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED 
5 AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME 
7 FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 2 THROUGH 4, INCLUSIVE; AND 
8 THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 
9 OF TESTIMONY GIVEN. 
10 
11 TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
12 8TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997, AT VERNAL, UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
2"! 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1-RUS3EL D. MORGAM, C3R \ 
